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DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD

 AND VICE 
VERSA: SELF-SUSTAINING 
NGO/NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
Barbara K. Bucholtz** 
―We must cultivate our [own] garden.‖ 
Voltaire*** 
                                                        
  TOM LEHRER, The Old Dope Peddler, on THE REMAINS OF TOM LEHRER 
(RCA 2000) (original recording at Kresge Auditorium, MIT, Cambridge MA 
11/23/59 and 11/24/59).  
 ** Barbara K. Bucholtz, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of 
Law; Executive Director, Nonprofit Law Center, University of Tulsa. 
 Earlier, and somewhat different, versions of this paper were presented in 
England at the ―Researching the Voluntary Sector‖ Conference, University of 
Warwick, August 31, 2005; New York City at the ―Conference on 
Entrepreneurship and Human Rights,‖ Fordham University Law School, August 
1, 2005; Athens, Greece at the International Law Conference, University of 
Athens, July 15, 2007; and in Canada at the ―Quo Vadis: The Boundaries of 
Modern Law‖ Conference, at Osgood Hall Law School, York University, May 
9, 2008. This final version benefits from the insights and comments of 
conference colleagues and those of James Fishman and Russell Christopher. 
 *** The complete sentence, ―That is well said; but we must cultivate our 
garden,‖ is the last sentence in Voltaire‘s Candide or Optimism, translated by 
Peter Constantive, with an introduction by Diane Johnson (Modern Library, 
2005). The sentence has traditionally been interpreted as a maxim, commanding 
not only the protagonists in the book but also individuals in general. See P.N. 
Furbank, Cultivating Voltaire’s Garden, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 15, 2005, at 68. 
It is because Voltaire‘s sentence depends for its effect upon an ambiguity—not 
so much in the word ―garden‖ as in the words ―our‖ and ―cultivate.‖ For ―our‖ is 
to be understood in the plural—where it refers literally to Candide, Cunegorde, 
Pangloss, etc., the owners of the garden—and in the singular, where it is 
addressed metaphorically to any or every man or woman. As a maxim, it 
instantly takes hold of the reader‘s imagination, and there are really no other 
words in which it can be expressed. 
 Here, I intend that Voltaire‘s injunction apply to nonprofit organizations 
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―I will do it myself: said the Little Red Hen, and she did!‖ 
The Little Red Hen 
INTRODUCTION 
The nonprofit sector is under siege. Recent articles pointing out 
the astonishing rise of for-profit activity by associations in the 
nonprofit sector advocate various forms of corrective regulation to 
restrict or reform the sector.
1
 While acknowledging the 
proliferation and the threat business activity may pose to the 
integrity of the nonprofit sector, this Article argues that regulation, 
alone, does not address the underlying problem: a significant 
impetus for the increase in for-profit activity by nonprofits has 
been the diminution in government services and resources to deal 
with societal issues.
2
 Given the current bias against government, a 
more complete description of the phenomenon must surely include 
                                                        
that feel compelled to raise money through various forms of entrepreneurial 
activity, given the ideological context in which they operate. But, given the risks 
commercial activity by nonprofits entails both to the sector itself, and to the 
society in general, it is also addressed to the public and the sector through which 
it acts: the government sector. 
  THE LITTLE RED HEN (Penguin Group 2006). The reference here is to 
the same effect. Nonprofits today often feel constrained to raise money by going 
beyond traditional sources (donations; grants) for funding their respective 
missions because the public, through its government sector, has withdrawn its 
own support. 
1 See John D. Colombo, Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on 
Commercial Activity by Charities, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 667 (2008) [hereinafter 
Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions]; James J. Fishman, Wrongway Corrigan 
and Recent Developments in the Nonprofit Landscape: A Need for New Legal 
Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 567 (2007); see also John D. Colombo, 
Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
487 (2002); John D. Colombo, Regulating Commercial Activity by Exempt 
Charities: Resurrecting the Commensurate-in-Scope Doctrine, 39 EXEMPT ORG. 
TAX REV. 341 (2003). 
 2 See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 1, at 569 (―As government support declined 
as a result of the Reagan revolution, there was a convergence of the for-profit 
and nonprofit sectors. In the latter decades of the twentieth century, nonprofits 
moved into activities, providing them with sources of revenue that were not 
normally considered charitable[.]‖ (citations omitted)). 
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a recognition of the role played by ideological policy choices in 
contemporary American society, with its evident and generalized 
preference for problem-solving through free market forces. This 
Article explores some of the consequences of that policy 
preference for the nonprofit sector, but it also insists that 
recognition of the causal link between ideological policymaking 
and the hazards unleashed by the expansion of commercial activity 
by nonprofits must inform any reform of the law. The reduction in 
services from the government has increased the pressure on 
nonprofits to expand their own projects. New projects have 
required new resources. The emergent entrepreneurial initiatives 
can largely be explained by that phenomenon. A more pragmatic, 
less ideological, approach to societal problem-solving will serve as 
a significant corrective to commercial excesses in the nonprofit 
sector and may point the way to a systemic overhaul rather than 
merely restrictive reforms of the sector. 
After an overview of the three associational sectors in 
contemporary society (Part I) and the federal regulatory scheme 
under which they operate (Part II), the Article describes various 
forms of commercial activity by nonprofits and the dangers to the 
sector that ineluctably attach to those activities (Part III). In Part 
IV, I summarize the available evidence about the cause and effect 
of nonprofit business ventures and argue that any reform of the 
nonprofit sector must abandon ideological judgments of the public, 
nonprofit and market sectors in favor of a pragmatic approach. 
I. SOCIETY‘S THREE GOVERNANCE SECTORS 
A. Attributes of Each Sector 
In the United States, society is conceptualized as a tripartite of 
sectoral divisions: the public (government) sector; the private 
(business or market) sector and the not-for-profit (nonprofit or 
NGO) sector.
3
 Each sector is presumed to have unique strengths 
                                                        
 3 I use ―NGO‖ and ―nonprofit organizations‖ as interchangeable labels for 
voluntary organizations in civil society which are neither governmental bodies 
nor for-profit business associations, and exist to pursue a mission which is 
important to their membership and which confer a recognized ―public benefit‖ 
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and singular weaknesses.
4
 The public sector always has the powers 
of purse and sword
5
 and, operating as a constitutional democracy, 
is said to have the advantages of legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency. However, the very democratic processes that 
produce its legitimacy and require its accountability and 
transparency simultaneously detract from its responsiveness, its 
flexibility and its capacity to address unpopular but important 
societal problems. Constitutional democracies are (undoubtedly) 
ponderous, cumbersome and majoritarian as well as (presumably) 
legitimate, accountable and transparent. Scholars call 
government‘s weaknesses ―government failure.‖6 Conversely, both 
                                                        
upon society at large. See Margaret Gibelman & Sheldon R. Gelman, A Loss of 
Credibility: Patterns of Wrongdoing Among Nongovernmental Organizations, 
15 VOLUNTAS: INT‘L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 355, 357 (2004). 
However, there is a vigorous debate over labels and definitions about and within 
the sector because of the precision required for effective research about 
nonprofits. Conceptual clarification and the necessity of defining categories 
precisely affect the credibility of empirical findings. See Helmut K. Anheier, 
Reflections on the Concept and Measurement of Global Civil Society, 18 
VOLUNTAS: INT‘L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 1 (2007). Under the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Code (―Code‖), the tax that describes and regulates various 
kinds of nonprofit organizations—those which are deemed to confer a ―public 
benefit‖—are designated as ―501(c)(3)‖ organizations (for the Code section 
defining them), while other nonprofits (including various trade, political, 
advocacy, social associations) are considered to be ―mutual benefit‖ 
organizations and are defined at sections 501(c)(4) through 501(c)(25) of the 
Code. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). This paper‘s focus is 501(c)(3) or public benefit 
organizations. 
 4 See generally LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA‘S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A 
PRIMER 11–13 (2d ed., Foundation Center 1999). Salamon points out that the 
inherent weaknesses of the business sector (―market failure‖) account for the 
necessity of a nonprofit sector. 
5 The power of the purse: to raise money through compulsory taxation. See, 
e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (―Congress shall have [p]ower [t]o lay and 
collect [t]axes . . . .‖). The power of the sword: to enforce its commands through 
authorized force. Both are surely strengths. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 
(The President ―shall take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed . . . . ‖). 
 6 SALAMON, supra note 4. A related problem of government is that not only 
are its actions directed by majority will, but they are constrained by rules of 
equality. In contrast, nonprofit organizations in the private sector are free to 
allocate resources without regard for majority will or equal treatment of 
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the business sector and the nonprofit sector lack the powers of 
purse and sword but have the advantages of expeditious action, 
flexibility and the authority to operate without majority support 
from the public-at-large. Nonetheless, they can never claim the 
legitimacy of a democratic government. Nor, as private 
organizations, are they required to be transparent and accountable 
to the larger society. Moreover, the business sector can be 
distinguished from the nonprofit sector on the crucible of 
profitability. Businesses famously avoid unprofitable projects that 
are otherwise important—scholars call this trait ―market failure.‖7 
Therefore, nonprofits can be considered the sector of last resort or 
the safety net for worthy projects rejected by the government (as 
unpopular) and by the market (as unprofitable).
8
 
Understanding these characteristics helps develop an analytical 
baseline from which to assess each sector‘s aptitude for addressing 
specific societal projects and to predict the degree of success a 
particular sector is likely to attain by engaging a particular societal 
task.
9  
In the larger sense, however, the suitability of a sector for a 
particular task is dependent upon more than its inherent strengths 
and weaknesses. The political, economic and social milieu in 
which the societal project is situated must be considered. Different 
societies may assign various projects to different sectors. 
Furthermore, within a given society, project assignments may shift 
over time.
10
 Soldiers might be government employees in one war 
                                                        
recipients. Discussing this aspect of private foundation work, Steven 
Heydemann calls this ―positive discrimination.‖ See generally Steven 
Heydemann, Doing Democracy’s Work? Studying The Transformation of 
Global Philanthropy in the Twentieth Century, 2 DEMOCRACY & SOCIETY 5 
(Spring 2005).  
7 SALAMON, supra note 4, at 7. 
 8 See generally Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit 
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981). 
9 A suggestive example might be the problems associated with the use of 
mercenary forces under the direction of private corporations. See, e.g., JEREMY 
SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD‘S MOST POWERFUL 
MERCENARY ARMY (Nation Books 2008). Do the profit motive and the lack of 
accountability, transparency and legitimacy lend themselves to a satisfactory 
result in this context? 
10 See generally Peter Dobkin Hall, Historical Overview of the Private 
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and mercenaries in the next. Jails might be government-owned in 
one era and privately-owned in the next, and so forth.
11
 In any 
event, while the inherent attributes of each sector do not preordain 
its assignment to a particular societal problem, policy choices that 
lack a pragmatic appreciation for the importance of these 
characteristics seem questionable.
12
 On that basis alone, one may 
reasonably challenge the efficacy of policy choices driven by a 
dominant political philosophy that disparages the government 
sector and reifies the business sector.
13
 
                                                        
Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (Walter 
W. Powell ed., 1987); see also Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3, at 357. A 
recent example has emerged in California where private firefighting companies 
have become big business. Other states evince a rise in private companies‘ 
presence in the industry as well, but California‘s situation—owing to its recent 
problems with wildfires—is the most publicized example. Interestingly, this 
trend toward private contracting in the firefighting industry recalls colonial 
times when firefighting was exclusively the purview of the private sector. 
Experts are concerned about the trend for the very reasons that firefighting 
became a public sector obligation and private firefighting was abandoned: lack 
of transparency and accountability in training and performance standards in 
private sector firefighting and a concern about the public interest and common 
good. ―‗[F]ire protection should be available to all citizens regardless of how 
much money they have.‘‖ Malia Wollan, For Hire: Private Firefighters, TULSA 
WORLD, July 16, 2008, at A5 (quoting Lori Moore-Merrell, a researcher for the 
International Association of Firefighters). 
 11 An interesting instance was New York University‘s dominance in the 
pasta manufacturing business during the 1940s and 1950s. See, e.g., C.F. 
Mueller Co. v. Comm‘r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951). There, the court held that 
C.F. Mueller, a manufacturer and seller of macaroni and related products, 
qualified for exemption under § 501(c)(3) because its profits were distributed to 
its sole shareholder, New York University, for the exclusive benefit of its School 
of Law. Id. at 123. 
12 Imagine a statute mandating that prisons maintain high standards 
protecting inmate rights and that they institute practices designed to diminish 
recidivism. Imagine further that traditional prisons with practices designed 
simply to warehouse prisoners in order to protect the public from them are 
highly profitable. Finally, imagine that on economies of scale, the larger the 
prison population, the more profitable the prison. Pragmatically speaking, would 
the government sector or private businesses be more likely to implement the 
statute effectively? 
13 In an earlier article, I argued that U.S. efforts to privatize human rights 
initiatives are fundamentally flawed. The attempt to develop quasi-constitutional 
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B. The Ideological Turn in Public Policy 
As a consequence of America‘s current suspicions of the public 
sector, the United States has undergone a massive ―downsizing‖ of 
government services either by way of ―out-sourcing‖ its traditional 
functions to business and nonprofit organizations, or by 
―privatizing‖ services simply by failing to provide them. 
Government downsizing has placed a significant burden on the 
nonprofit sector: NGOs are now asked to provide many outsourced 
services under government contract and to fill the societal void left 
by unprofitable services the government has abandoned.
14
 In 
tandem, these two dimensions of government downsizing have 
stretched the financial resources of nonprofits—flowing from their 
traditional sources of donations and grants—to the limit. 
In response, nonprofit organizations have increasingly turned 
to for-profit business activity as a venue for supporting their 
respective missions. And while nonprofits have historically 
engaged in for-profit activities to raise money, these new 
commercial initiatives in this new era of government downsizing 
are often different in degree and kind. This new path from 
traditional sources of financial support to some measure of 
commercially generated financial independence is as fraught with 
                                                        
human rights norms through voluntary codes of conduct which have been 
developed exclusively by multi-national corporations and their trade groups 
appears to be an ineffective substitute for government-generated rules. As a 
practical matter, voluntary codes suffer from two major shortcomings: 
disclosure (or transparency) and compliance (or enforcement). Quite obviously, 
no one expects rigorous adherence to rules when disclosure and compliance are 
merely voluntary. Moreover, and putting the problem of their enforceability to 
one side, it is questionable whether codes drafted by various business entities 
can ever lay claim to the gravitas of constitutional legitimacy. Barbara K. 
Bucholtz, Privatizing Human Rights Initiatives: How Asian Countries Can 
Avoid the Flaws in the U.S. Model, 17 J. ASIAN ECON. 41 (2006). See also 
SALAMON, supra note 4, at 7–10. 
14 Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3, at 357. The authors point out that the 
downsizing phenomenon has affected NGOs worldwide: ―The growth and 
development of NGOs in the last quarter of the 20th century related, in part, to 
the worldwide quest to find alternatives to government service provision, a quest 
largely borne out of disillusionment with government‘s handling of the welfare 
state.‖ Id. (internal citations and references omitted). 
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peril as it is with promise. Teasing out both aspects of the 
phenomenon adds to our understanding as to whether, or to what 
extent, this commercial turn in nonprofit activity is beneficial. 
However, both the pragmatic dimensions of commercialization and 
the effects of statutory constraints should be considered. 
II. STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
A. Overview of Exempt Organization Regulation under the 
Internal Revenue Code 
As described by the Internal Revenue Code, the nonprofit 
universe is large and diverse, encompassing some twenty-eight 
categories of not-for-profit associations.
15
 That universe is divided 
into two fundamentally different kinds of association: those that 
are organized for some ―public benefit‖ and those that are 
organized for some ―mutual benefit‖16 or shared interest of their 
members.
17
 The public benefit associations are also divided by the 
Code into two categories: (1) private grant making and operating 
foundations
18
 and (2) public operating charities. While all 501(c) 
organizations enjoy income tax exemption, § 501(c)(3) operating 
charities and most § 509 private foundations also benefit from a 
tax deduction for their donors.
19
 
This Article is concerned exclusively with § 501(c)(3) 
operating charities. It is within this category that commercial 
activity is burgeoning and it is this activity which most concerns 
recent scholarship calling for reform.
20
 One place to begin a 
                                                        
15 See generally I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). 
16 ―Mutual benefit‖ organizations include shared trade, political and social 
interests. See id. § 501(c)(4)–(28); see also id. §§ 501(d), 501(e), 501(f), 501(k) 
& 521. 
17 See I.R.C. § 509 (2006). 
18 See id. §§ 170(c)(2), 2055(a)(2) & 2522(a)(2). 
19 Fishman, supra note 1, at 569–71. 
20 See, e.g., Trinidad v. Sagrada Order de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 582 
(1924). Tax breaks for charities are, thus, often rationalized as a ―quid pro quo.‖ 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 328 (James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz eds., 
Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2006). 
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discussion of the statutory constraints on these charitable 
organizations is with the legislative purpose or policy behind the 
statutory sections that confer the tax benefits they enjoy under the 
Internal Revenue Code. Not always an exemplar of legislative 
clarity, the tax code itself gives no indication of the legislators‘ 
intent, nor does the congressional bill from which the Code 
sections derive.
21
 Undoubtedly, the tax breaks enjoyed by charities 
are part of a philanthropical tradition with its roots in Western 
history and, surely, they are derived from the Elizabethan era‘s 
Statute of Charitable Uses in England.
22
 But the tax exempt status 
of nonprofits has, perhaps, been rationalized best by Supreme 
Court case law which has explained that exempt charities provide a 
―public benefit‖ by conferring resources and services which the 
government (and, therefore, taxpayers) would otherwise have to 
finance.
23
 In that sense, it can be said that a charity‘s activities 
contribute to the tax base by providing goods and services that 
taxes would be obliged to finance. As a preliminary legal matter, 
then, any charitable entity claiming § 501(c)(3) status but engaging 
in commercial activity must demonstrate that it is providing a 
public benefit.
24
 
The concept of ―public benefit,‖ in turn, can best be described 
by the categories of ―charitable purposes‖ codified in the Statute of 
Charitable Uses, and listed in the Restatements (Second) and 
(Third) of Trusts;
25
 under the 2006 draft of the American Law 
Institute (ALI) Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations;
26
 
and in the Treasury Regulations promulgated under § 501(c)(3) of 
                                                        
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. a (1959); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003). 
22 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 370 (Discussion Draft 
2006). 
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (stating that ―charitable exemptions are justified on 
the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit . . . which the society or 
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide‖). 
24 See, e.g., Treas. Reg § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006). 
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. a (1959); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003). 
26 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 370 (Discussion Draft 
2006). 
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the tax code.
27
 As Marion R. Fremont-Smith has explained, all of 
these authorities identify similar categories of charitable purposes 
and share the same broad view of their interpretation.
28
 These 
categories are: ―relief of poverty, advancement of knowledge or 
education, advancement of religion, promotion of health and 
governmental or municipal purposes and ‗[o]ther purposes . . . 
which are beneficial to the community.‘‖29  
In addition to the overarching requirement of a public benefit 
mission and the necessity of fitting within a recognized charitable 
category, a § 501(c)(3) charity must observe the following 
requirements: 
1. The Exclusivity Test: it must be operated ―exclusively‖ 
for its charitable purpose mission.
30
 
2. The Nondistribution Constraint or the No Private 
Inurement Rule: its net income may not ―inure to the 
benefit‖ of an insider (member; employee) within the 
organization.
31
 
                                                        
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006). 
 28 Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of 
Nonprofit Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for 
Changes, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 616–17 (2008). 
29 Id. at 617. Section 501(c)(3) provides that organizations receive the tax 
exemption for public charities if they are: 
Operated exclusively for religious, charitable scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or 
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or 
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual, no substantial part of the activities is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation (except as 
otherwise provided in subsection (h) and which does not participate in 
or intervene in . . . the political campaign of any candidate for public 
office. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
30 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The term ―exclusively,‖ however, is a term of art that 
is not applied literally or narrowly. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1), (2) 
(as amended in 2008). 
31 Treas. Regs. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1), (2) (as amended in 2008). Unlike 
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3. Lobbying and Campaigning Prohibitions: while a charity 
is absolutely precluded from campaigning for a political 
candidate, it is permitted to engage in limited lobbying 
efforts as long as ―no substantial part‖ of its operations is 
engaged in attempting to influence legislation.
32 
Business activity can threaten the exempt status of a charity 
under the legislative constraints of the exclusivity test and the non-
distribution rule as well as other statutory rules governing 
nonprofit associations. 
B. Federal Tax Code Restraints That Affect Commercial 
Activity by Nonprofits 
1. The Exclusivity Test 
For purposes of constraining commercial activity, the 
exclusivity test is obviously most relevant.
33
 To what extent or at 
what point might a nonprofit‘s business cause it to fail the 
exclusivity requirement? Case law and agency regulation have not 
imposed a strict standard of exclusivity on nonprofit operations.
34
 
Some deviation from activities that are ―exclusively‖ mission-
related has been consistently permitted. Furthermore, early case 
law interpreting § 501(c)(3) established a longstanding precedent 
                                                        
for-profit corporations, insiders in nonprofit organizations cannot ―profit‖ from 
income generated by charities. Although charities may very well be profitable, 
that profit, after expenses of running the charity have been paid, must inure to 
the benefit of the charitable mission, not the charity‘s members or employees. In 
order to save the exempt status of otherwise qualified charities who may run 
afoul of this private benefit rule by providing excess benefits to insiders, 
Congress has provided intermediate sanctions or penalties in lieu of revocation 
of the organization‘s nonprofit status, which remains the ultimate sanction for 
violation of the no private inurement rule. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2006); I.R.C. 
§ 6033(b)(12) (2006). 
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008). Charities can 
protect themselves from the vagaries of the ―no substantial part‖ language by 
electing 501(h) formulas for determining permissible levels of lobbying activity 
or by channeling lobbying efforts through a 501(c)(4) affiliate. Id. 
33 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
34 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008).   
BUCHOLTZ_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:35 PM 
414 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
that some commercial activity, extraneous to the charitable 
mission, was permitted without violating the exclusivity test.
35
 
Indeed, for decades following the Trinidad decision, any amount 
of commercial activity was permitted under the exclusivity test as 
long as the net proceeds of the business were dedicated to the 
charitable mission.
36
 This was called the ―destination of income‖ 
test; its zenith, now celebrated in law school lore, is the C.F. 
Mueller case,
37
 which exonerated a successful pasta business 
operated exclusively for profit because its net profits supported the 
New York University law school.
38
 Whether the safe harbor for 
commercial activity provided by the ―destination of income‖ rule 
has been completely eliminated by subsequent legislation and 
regulation is still somewhat unclear. 
2. The Unrelated Business Income Tax 
The Unrelated Business Income Tax (―UBIT‖), as well as the 
Treasury regulation promulgated under it, is the second major 
legislative constraint upon business activity by nonprofit 
associations.
39
 Facially, UBIT appears not to foreclose nonprofit 
status for charities that engage in commercial projects. Rather, it 
imposes a tax on a nonprofit‘s business income generated through 
activities not related to its charitable mission. Congress did, 
however, expressly foreclose nonprofit status for organizations that 
are exclusively for-profit but dedicate net proceeds to affiliated 
charities (―feeder organizations‖).40 Thus, with the exception of 
                                                        
35 See Trinidad v. Sagrada Order de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 582 (1924) 
(holding that sales of specialty foodstuffs by a religious organization, even 
though commercial and not the organization‘s charitable mission, did not cause 
it to fail the exclusivity test). 
36 Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, supra 
note 1, at 497–98. 
37 C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm‘r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951). 
38 Id. 
39 I.R.C. §§ 511514 (2006). Section 513 provides that any ―trade or 
business‖ which is regularly carried on by a nonprofit and ―not substantially 
related‖ to its charitable mission will be taxed as ordinary business income. Id. 
§ 513. 
40 Id. § 502. 
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feeder organizations, one could argue that UBIT only taxes 
charities for business activity unrelated to their mission. It does not 
appear to jeopardize their exempt status under § 501(c)(3). But a 
closer look at the Treasury regulations and Revenue Rulings of the 
Internal Revenue Service (―Service‖) call that conclusion into 
question. Specifically, it is possible to detect an ambiguity, if not a 
contradiction, between the language of different regulations. 
Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i), dealing with tax 
exempt status, says that to attain or maintain its exempt status, a 
nonprofit‘s charter may permit only an insubstantial part of its 
operations to consist of ―activities which in themselves are not in 
furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.‖41  
Is business activity to support its exempt purpose considered an 
―in furtherance of‖ activity? Experts have concluded that only 
substantial unrelated business activity not ―in furtherance of‖ an 
exempt purpose would disqualify a nonprofit from exempt status.
42
 
Thus, business activity that supports the charity but is not 
substantial will not threaten the charity‘s mission. Is this 
interpretation of the exemption rules consistent with UBIT 
regulations? Are the terms ―in furtherance of‖ under § 501(c)(3) 
regulations and ―unrelated activity‖ under UBIT consonant? 
Ambiguity lurks in key terms: is any ―unrelated activity‖ under 
UBIT ―in furtherance of‖ a charitable mission or not?43 The final 
                                                        
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(b) (2006). 
42 A nonprofit engaged in business activity may be exempt in spite of the 
fact that 
it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if the 
operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the 
organization‘s exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization is 
not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an 
unrelated trade or business, as defined in section 513. 
Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1). Professor Colombo concludes the pivotal provision is 
―in furtherance of‖ and seems to give that kind of commerce an imprimatur. But 
as he incisively points out, it is not clear whether UBIT activity is ―in 
furtherance of.‖ Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 671 
(citing Jessica Pena & Alexander L.T. Reid, A Call for Reform of the 
Operational Test for Unrelated Commercial Activity in Charities, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1855, 1863–64 (2001)). 
43 Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 671.  
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regulations issued under UBIT suggest that they are not: to avoid 
the UBIT tax, an activity like a commercial venture must be 
―substantially related‖ to the exempt purpose, requiring that the 
venture intend ―to further (other than through the production of 
income)‖ the exempt purpose.44 The ―other than through the 
production of income‖ language of UBIT is in conflict with the ―in 
furtherance of‖ language of the regulation on exemption at 
Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e).
45
  
One way to synthesize the language is to read the two 
provisions as serving two different legislative purposes. Then 
―substantially related‖ and ―to further‖ (or ―in furtherance of‖) can 
mean something quite different when you are speaking about the 
§ 501(c)(3) exemption or about UBIT taxation. In citing a 1964 
revenue ruling, Professor John Colombo argues that the regulations 
should be, and have been, harmonized by interpreting UBIT 
regulations to preclude income generation as passing an ―in 
furtherance of‖ test while income generation in furtherance of 
§ 501(c)(3) exemption is permissible.
46
 Some commentators have 
argued that this same 1964 revenue ruling gives guidance to 
nonprofits that seek to ensure their for-profit activity passes 
regulatory muster by creating a ―commensurate in scope test.‖47 
That test, upon which the ruling was based, simply says that even 
where a nonprofit relies solely on business-generated income, it 
will not lose its exempt status as long as its charitable operations 
are ―commensurate in scope‖ with the amount of financial 
resources dedicated to its charitable mission.
48
 Further assurance 
may be found in a memorandum from IRS General Counsel upon 
which the 1964 revenue ruling itself relied. It stated that the 
                                                        
44 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-2(a)(4) (2006). 
45 See Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 671–72. 
46 Id. at 672–73 (citing Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186, for the 
proposition that rental income as a principal source of revenue for a nonprofit 
would not cause it to lose its exempt status but would be taxable as unrelated to 
its charitable mission). 
47 See Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical 
Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2486 
(2005). 
48 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 598. 
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―primary purpose‖ test, which elaborates and liberalizes the 
―exclusivity‖ requirement of § 501(c)(3), looks to ―the dedication 
of net revenues from an unrelated business to charitable 
purposes . . . .‖49 By logical contrast, only where business income 
is not significantly dedicated to the charity‘s mission will the 
charity fail the exclusivity test and lose (or never receive) its 
exempt status.
50
  
Despite these reassuring interpretations, however, 
indeterminacies and ambiguities in pivotal statutory language 
construed under an ―all the facts and circumstances‖ test51 counsel 
caution for charities engaged in commercial activity. Business 
activity by a charity may not only be taxed under UBIT, it may 
threaten a charity‘s exempt status. Given those risks, a charity may 
(as many have done) separate itself from its business activity by 
creating a for-profit subsidiary to house its business operations.
52
 
But that strategy may prove an illusory safe harbor. 
3. Section 509 Foundations  
Other Code sections reveal different hazards for this kind of 
entrepreneurial activity by a wholly owned subsidiary of a charity. 
It is possible that a nonprofit that sustains itself with an unrelated 
business may find itself recategorized as a more heavily regulated 
private foundation rather than as a public charity.
53
 The problem 
might arise whenever a charity is primarily supported by a 
                                                        
49 Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 673. 
50 Professor Colombo quotes a more recent General Counsel Memorandum 
to that effect. Id. at 674 n.30. 
51 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 59798 (―[T]he primary 
purpose test looks to ‗all the facts and circumstances . . . including the size and 
extent of the trade or business and the size or extent of the activities, which are 
in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.‘‖(quoting Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.50(c)(3)-1(e) (2006)). 
52 See infra Part III.D.  
53 Private foundations are § 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations but they are 
not public charities. See I.R.C. § 509(a) (defining a private foundation in 
contrast to public charities). Operating charities are § 501(c)(3) public charities. 
Id. § 501(c)(3). 
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financially successful business subsidiary owned by the charity.
54
 
As the parent corporation,
55
 the charity could receive enough 
financial support through subsidiary dividends so that it does not 
have to rely on any support from outside sources, in the form of 
donations and government or private grants. Members of the parent 
organization govern the organization without including outside 
directors
56
 on the subsidiary‘s or its own governing board of 
directors. In that situation, the organization would strongly 
resemble a private foundation with respect to the attributes for 
which Congress determined that foundations required special 
regulation.
57
 From the legislative perspective, private foundations 
may be distinguished from operating (public) charities by their 
funding source (a family or an individual, as opposed to a disparate 
group of donors from the public-at-large) and by their governing 
body (a policy-making board that directs the activities of the 
organization whose directors are drawn from the family or a small 
insular group, as opposed to a governance board drawn from 
diverse members of the community).  
Another distinguishing feature of foundations is that they are 
usually grant-making institutions that give financial support to 
operating charities rather than perform charitable services 
themselves.
58
 For decades, private foundations were treated like 
operating charities under the federal tax code. But during the 1950s 
                                                        
54 For a discussion of this kind of self-sustaining nonprofit, see infra Part 
III.D.  
55 ―Parent corporation‖ is a term of art in corporate governance law that 
usually indicates that one corporation (the ―parent‖) owns another corporation 
(the ―subsidiary‖) because it owns all the shares of stock of the subsidiary (―sole 
shareholder‖). See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER H. KRAAKMAN & 
GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 30611 (2d ed. 2007). 
56 ―Outside directors‖ in corporate governance law parlance means 
directors who are not members or employees—that is, ―insiders‖—in the 
organization. Id. at 32223. 
57 See generally the Tax Reform Act of 1969, infra note 60 and 
accompanying text. 
58 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 75354 (quoting F. 
EMERSON ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPY IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (Philanthropic 
Foundations 1974).  
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and 1960s, Congress began to take legislative steps to distinguish 
these two kinds of § 501(c)(3) organizations by ratcheting up the 
regulatory structures applied to private foundations.
59
 That 
movement culminated in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
60
 Public 
outcry that led to this new regulatory regime for private 
foundations included concerns about financial corruption (using 
tax breaks to benefit insiders rather than exempt purposes) and 
political influences (using foundation money to support leftist 
causes).
61
 But the overarching concern seems to have been the 
insularity of the private foundation: its privileged ability to sustain 
itself and its selected causes coupled with its undiluted authority to 
champion its own notions of what causes were in the public 
interest.
62
  
Succinctly, one might ask: If charities must perform a public 
benefit, who gets to say which causes within a charitable category 
most benefit the public and should be supported by a foundation? 
Public charities that rely on financial support from the public must, 
to a great extent, rely on a consensus notion of public benefit to 
maintain the public‘s financial support. Foundations, however, are 
self-sustaining and thus do not solicit public monies. As a 
consequence, they are not dependent upon public support to 
advance the causes they select. The same can be said for self-
sustaining operating charities financed by sufficiently profitable 
business subsidiaries. Both avoid public accountability. By 
analogy, self-sustaining charities might be considered ―operating 
foundations‖ if not ―grantmaking foundations.‖63 Both are more 
heavily regulated than operating public charities.
64 
Thus, a charity 
                                                        
59 Id. at 592–99 (quoting WALDEMAR A. NIELSON, The BIG FOUNDATIONS: 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STUDY 7–17 (Columbia University Press 
1972)). 
60 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 1(a), 83 Stat. 487 (1969) 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1). 
61  See NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 82729. 
62 Id. at 761. 
63 Tanya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax Treatment of 
Private Foundations and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. 137, 141 (2002) 
64 The distinction between ―operating foundations‖ and private foundations 
is that operating foundations operate organizations that perform charitable or 
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supported by its for-profit subsidiary is open to a judicial challenge 
as to whether the corporate veil, which sets up a protective wall of 
separation between it and its subsidiary, should be pierced. 
Under most state corporate governance statutes, the owner 
(individual shareholder or corporate parent) of a for-profit 
subsidiary will be protected by a shield of limited liability for the 
debts of the corporation she/it owns.
65
 Delaware, for example, 
provides that owners/shareholders ―shall not be personally liable 
for the payment of the corporation‘s debts except as they may be 
liable by reason of their own conduct or acts . . . . ‖66 But the shield 
itself has been limited by an equitable doctrine of the common law 
known as ―piercing the corporate veil.‖67 The doctrine permits 
courts to disregard the separate corporate existence that shields the 
owners from the debts of their corporation under a two-pronged 
test.
68
  
The first prong asks whether the formalities required by 
corporate governance statutes have been observed so that the 
business appears to be operating as a legal entity separate from its 
owners, or whether it appears to be a ―mere instrumentality‖ of its 
owners because there is ―such unity of interest and ownership that 
the separate personalities of the corporation and its 
shareholders . . . are indistinct . . . .‖69 The second prong asks 
whether the corporate form is being used to evade other ―legal 
obligations.‖70 To be sure, the ―piercing‖ doctrine has been applied 
                                                        
public benefit services. Museums are an example; their mission is to advance 
public understanding and appreciation of art by exhibiting art collections. But, 
because they are typically supported and dominated by a small and insular 
group, they retain the status of foundations, not charities. See NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 82729. 
65 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
6002 (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1006 (2006). 
66 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (2006); accord MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 6.22(b) (2004). 
67 See, e.g., NLRB v. Greater Kansas Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1051–55 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (providing discussion on the doctrine); Mobridge Cmty. Ind. v. 
Toure, 273 N.W.2d 128, 132 (S.D. 1978) (same).  
68 Greater Kansas Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052. 
69 Id.; see also Mobridge, 273 N.W.2d at 132. 
70 Greater Kansas Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052 (―[W]ould adherence to [the 
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sparingly as an instrument to protect creditors.
71
 Furthermore, there 
are strong public policy reasons for maintaining the legal fiction of 
a shield.
72 
Nonetheless, there is nothing to preclude application of 
this intractably vague doctrine
73 
where, as here, the separate 
corporate entities are, arguably, being used to evade either income 
taxation under UBIT, termination of exempt status under 
§ 501(c)(3) regulations, or the stringent regulations applicable to 
                                                        
legal] corporate fiction sanction fraud, promote injustice or inequitable 
consequences or lead to an evasion of legal obligations.‖).  
71 See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003) (―The 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, however, is the rare exception, applied in 
the case of fraud or certain other exceptional circumstances . . . and usually 
determined on a case-by-case basis.‖). 
72 ―Piercing the corporate veil‖ to hold shareholders liable for the liabilities 
of a corporation is indeed a rare judicial act. See generally ALLEN, KRAAKMAN 
& SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 55, at 151. 
The most frequently invoked—and radical—form of shareholder 
liability in the cause of creditor protection is the equitable power of the 
court to set aside the entity status of the corporation and hold its 
shareholders liable directly . . . . One common formulation [of the 
doctrine] requires that plaintiff shows the existence of a shareholder 
who completely dominates corporate policy and uses her control to 
commit . . . a ―wrong‖ . . . Another formulation . . . calls on courts to 
disregard the corporate form whenever recognition of it would extend 
the principle of incorporation ―beyond its legitimate purposes and 
[would] produce injustices or inequitable consequences.‖ [citation 
omitted]. All courts agree that veil piercing should be done 
sparingly . . . .  
Id. See also Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 674 n.57 
and accompanying text. 
73 In his case book, Chiappinelli calls the doctrine ―a mystery.‖ ERIC A. 
CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 276 (Aspen 
2006). He comments,  
[i]t is one of the most frequently litigated issues in corporate law but, 
although the doctrine is quite old, courts are vague and inconsistent in 
their statement of the legal principles involved. When courts apply the 
doctrine, their opinions are nearly always simply gestalt results rather 
than genuinely articulated decisions . . . . [In Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. 
Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926),] Judge Cardozo called piercing the 
corporate veil a doctrine ―enveloped in the mists of metaphor.‖  
Id. 
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foundations. Charities that sustain their operations financially 
through the business ventures of for-profit subsidiaries are 
vulnerable to the charge that they are, in tandem with their for-
profit subsidiaries, operating as private foundations. 
A court might reason that the purposes for which shareholders 
are granted limited liability under corporate governance laws—to 
protect a parent shareholder from liability for the debts of its 
subsidiary—should not be used to evade laws designed to act as 
surrogates for public participation in the decision-making of 
foundations, to force public accountability or to ensure public 
benefits.
74
 On those grounds, a court might pierce the corporate 
veil between the charitable parent and the commercial subsidiary 
that finances its operations under a theory of ―enterprise entity.‖75 
The analogy seems to work; enterprise entity theory allows parent-
subsidiary or brother-sister corporations to be treated as single 
entities whenever the operations of each form a single business 
enterprise. A charity and its own business subsidiary that sustains 
it might also be considered a single enterprise.
76
 As a single 
enterprise, a public charity of this sort could be deemed either a 
private foundation or an operating foundation, depending on 
whether its charitable operations are grant-making (like a private 
foundation) or charitable activities (like a public operating charity). 
Like the charity that engages in commerce itself, the charity that 
seeks to separate its business activity through a subsidiary 
corporation risks exposure to the constraints of the Internal 
Revenue Code‘s provisions regulating nonprofits. 
4. The Non-Distribution Constraint 
Finally, while the exclusivity test under § 501(c)(3) is a most 
obvious hazard for nonprofits supported by commercial activity, 
the Code‘s private inurement prohibition might also pose a threat 
                                                        
74 For a discussion on the evolution of private foundation regulation, see 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 760–62. 
75 For a discussion of enterprise entity theory (enterprise liability), see 
CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 73, at 284–85. 
76 Id. at 284–85. 
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to a charity‘s nonprofit state if it engages in business activity.77 
Private inurement is the sine qua non of for-profit activity; the 
purpose of commercial enterprise is to generate a return on the 
owner‘s investment—net profit in the form of dividends in a 
corporate form of doing business, along with an appreciating value 
of the enterprise owned. As noted before, though, § 501(c)(3) 
prohibits profit generated by a nonprofit to be paid over to 
―insiders‖ within the association. Thus, as public charities ally 
themselves with commercial enterprise they must be wary of the 
―no private inurement‖ prohibition, especially with regard to 
compensation paid to employees and other insiders.
78
  
Without question, commercial activity can be a crucial 
financial resource for nonprofits that are faced with important 
societal problems that are not being addressed by the two other 
sectors, but lack sufficient income from traditional sources to meet 
the challenge. At the same time, putting aside a pragmatic 
consideration of which of the three sectors is best suited to manage 
a particular societal problem, hazards lurk in the federal tax code 
for nonprofits engaged in business activity. Moreover, and in 
addition to the statutory hazards discussed above, commercial 
activity may jeopardize the status of nonprofits in other respects. A 
review of the various kinds of nonprofit/entrepreneurial activity 
that we observe today and the risks business activity poses, both 
within and beyond the Internal Revenue Code, will illustrate the 
point. 
III. CATEGORIES OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY BY NONPROFITS: THEIR 
CHARACTERISTICS, ADVANTAGES, AND DOWNSIDE RISKS 
Scholars and journalists have reported extensively on the 
significant increase in commercial activity by nonprofit 
associations.
79
 As these texts demonstrate, there are several ways 
                                                        
77 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006). 
78 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
79 See, e.g., TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 
Cambridge University Press 2000); NONPROFITS & BUSINESS: A NEW WORLD 
OF INNOVATION AND ADAPTATION (Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 
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to categorize and analyze the various kinds of nonprofit/business 
activity.
80
  This Article employs a template based upon the way 
nonprofits treat their business activity and it identifies five types of 
structures nonprofits use for their businesses. 
A. Type 1 
A nonprofit may confine its for-profit activity to business 
activity that is integral to its mission—for example, selling tickets 
to opera productions sponsored by a nonprofit opera group, or 
charging tuition and fees to students enrolled in a nonprofit college 
or university.
81
 Similarly, a nonprofit may conduct for-profit 
business activity that the IRS would consider so closely-related to 
the charitable mission that it is not ―unrelated‖ to its mission and, 
therefore, will escape UBIT—for example, an art appreciation 
organization formed to educate the public about art by selling 
artwork at its gallery.
82 
These kinds of commercial activities are not likely to run afoul 
of the federal tax code, as long as a related purpose is identified 
within one of the charitable categories mentioned in Part II.
83
 But 
perhaps it should not be enough for a nonprofit to claim merely a 
patent affinity with a charitable mission. Professor Colombo 
advances this argument. An example that he gives to illustrate the 
point is that of a nonprofit hospital—facially a public charity and 
traditionally considered to be so because it appears, 
unquestionably, to fit into the charitable categories as it is related 
                                                        
The Urban Institute 2008); Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, 
at 667–68 (identifying several media reports and scholarly texts analyzing the 
phenomenon); Fishman, supra note 1, at 571–72. 
80 See, e.g., Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 683 
(separating the spectrum into five categories). 
81 See, e.g., Goldsboro Art League v. Comm‘r, 75 T.C. 337, 346 (1980). 
While the express rationale for the ruling in Goldsboro was premised on the 
exclusivity test, the court also stated that art sales assisted the Art League‘s 
charitable mission of art education. Id. at 343–44. In that sense, it can be said 
that sales of artwork, while commercial in nature, were not unrelated to the 
League‘s exempt purpose. 
82 Id. 
83 See supra Part II. 
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to serving the advancement of health.
84
 
 
But if, as is often the case 
in today‘s economy, nonprofit hospitals operate in a way that is 
―virtually identical to for-profit hospitals in similar markets,‖85 
Colombo observes that the commercial activity of selling their 
health care services for a fee appears not to qualify as an activity 
substantially related to a charitable purpose. Furthermore, its 
mission should have difficulty surviving an ―exclusivity‖ analysis; 
in Internal Revenue Service parlance, it should not be considered 
to have passed the ―operational test.‖86 The reason that nonprofits 
operating like for-profit hospitals escape operational test analysis 
has largely to do with a slippage or liberalization in the regulatory 
standards the Service has applied to hospitals over time.
87
 
                                                        
84 Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 683–84; see also 
John D. Colombo, The Failure of Community Benefit, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 29, 
30–37 (2005). 
85 Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 683–84. 
86 See NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 351–52; Colombo, 
Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 597. 
87 As Fishman and Schwarz explain: 
When § 501(c)(3) was first enacted, most nonprofit hospitals operated 
like traditional charities by treating indigent patients and relying on 
volunteer labor. The Service‘s first articulation of a standard for 
hospital tax exemptions was consistent with this traditional concept of 
charitable. In a 1956 ruling, the Service relied on ―relief of poverty‖ as 
the underlying rationale for exemption and required a tax-exempt 
hospital to treat indigent patients without regard to their ability to pay. 
Rev. Ruling 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 . . . . [In 1969,] the Service 
discarded the charity care requirement, replacing it with a community 
benefit standard that mirrored the ―charitable‖ concept articulated in the 
1969 Treasury Regulations. 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 384. The 1969 ruling, Rev. 
Ruling 69-545, stated that the revised standard, ―community benefit‖—which 
relied on the traditional charitable categories of education and promotion of 
health but diminished the importance of relief—retained a vestige of the poverty 
relief standard. It required nonprofit hospitals to provide emergency room 
services. However, boutique hospitals (hospitals specializing in a certain kind of 
healthcare: plastic surgery, cancer treatment, etc.) were an exemption from the 
emergency room care requirement as long as they passed other tests that assured 
the Service they were, somehow, providing a community benefit. As matters 
now stand, the Service—in the face of the onslaught of HMOs in the 1990s—
has modified its liberalized standard regarding health care facilities but has 
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Nevertheless, society derives no benefit from conferring nonprofit 
status on for-profit commerce simply because it can make a facial 
claim to be a charity. The pragmatic scrutiny Colombo advocates 
makes good public policy sense. 
Hospitals, though, are not the only entities claiming nonprofit 
status that deserve closer scrutiny. In a larger context, all fee-for-
service nonprofits and those in which business activities are 
closely related to a facially charitable mission should undergo the 
same pragmatic scrutiny to ascertain whether and to what extent: 
1. They operate more as for-profits than as charities; 
2. Their designation as § 501(c)(3) charities tends to dilute 
or compromise the designation and its public policy 
rationale; and  
3. The mission itself would be best performed by a for-
profit institution or a governmental counterpart rather than 
a nonprofit. The salient questions are: what is it that society 
requires from hospitals and other fee-for-service nonprofits 
or business activities related to a charitable mission, and—
given the characteristics of each sector—which is more 
likely to perform those functions adequately? 
This analytical template should be applied to all fee-for-service 
charities and those with related commercial activities.
88 
While 
                                                        
never returned to the traditional standard. Id. at 392–93. For a detailed 
description of the current standard, see IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 325 
F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003). 
88 Fee-for-services have represented a significant proportion of 
commercially-generated revenues for nonprofit association. Since 1977—well 
before the downsizing of government and the wave of new commercial 
enterprises by nonprofits that followed in its wake—established nonprofit 
theaters reported that two-thirds of their incomes were generated by their fee-
for-services box office tickets. Robert J. Anderson, Jr. & Sonia P. Malfezou, The 
Economic Condition of the Live Professional Theatre in America, in RESEARCH 
IN THE ARTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON POLICY RELATED STUDIES 
OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT OF THE ARTS 63–65 (1977). That figure seems 
to have remained stable even after government downsizing. In 2000, the IRS 
reported that fee-for-service income represents about two-thirds of nonprofit 
budgets. Michael H. Shuman & Marrian Fuller, Profits for Justice, NATION, Jan. 
24, 2005, at 13–14 (discussing fee-for-service revenues from tuition fees for 
students matriculating in a private nonprofit university and membership dues for 
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existing analytical tests, like the ―commensurate in scope‖ test, 
shed some light on the primary purpose and operational realities, it 
is important to extend the analysis beyond the scope of the Code 
and its regulations to policy concerns about the integrity of the 
nonprofit sector and pragmatic concerns about each sector‘s 
aptitude to undertake a particular societal challenge. 
B. Type 2  
Fee-for-service revenues are synonymous with or closely 
related to a charity‘s mission, but a second category of the way a 
nonprofit structures its business activity may be totally unrelated to 
its mission. An example of this kind of commercial activity 
engages the nonprofit in lending its reputation to support a 
business enterprise in exchange for an often substantial fee. A 
notable collaboration of this kind was that of the American 
Medical Association, which bound itself contractually to Sunbeam 
Corporation to endorse Sunbeam‘s products in exchange for 
lucrative endorsement fees.
89 
 Not surprisingly, these kinds of 
collaborations raise concerns that an endorsement could jeopardize 
the reputation and credibility of the nonprofit, or even undermine 
its mission. One could reasonably inquire: does the American 
Medical Association really believe that all of Sunbeam‘s 
appliances offer an unalloyed health benefit to the American 
public? If not, does the diminution in its credibility, reputation and 
even its mission constitute a poor bargain for the income received 
from the endorsement? 
The flipside of endorsements by nonprofits of for-profit 
business is sponsorships by for-profits to support nonprofit 
missions. While both kinds of collaborations may offer substantial 
revenues to the nonprofit, sponsorships appear to cause less 
                                                        
health clubs owned and operated by YMCAs and YWCAs). 
89 Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing: Growing 
Links Between Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO 
PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR 1, 2 
(Cambridge University Press 1998). It should be noted, however, that the 
American Medical Association is a nonprofit trade association, a § 501(c)(6) 
organization and not a § 501(c)(3) organization.  
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reputational concern.  However, they may trigger UBIT. 
Sponsorships, since the 1990s, have become increasingly visible, 
especially in the world of college sports.
90 
 But they also abound in 
the larger
 
nonprofit universe. 
91 
 The Service initially found them to 
be more than mere ―donor acknowledgments‖ and, therefore, 
taxable under UBIT.
92 
But Congress, acceding to public pressure, 
carved out an exception to UBIT for what it deemed ―Qualified 
Sponsorship Payments‖ (―QSPs‖) at § 513(i) of the Code. 93  QSPs 
                                                        
90 In Tech Adv. Memo 9147007, the Service ruled that income received by 
nonprofits in, for example, the naming of sporting events were taxable. In the 
Memo, the Mobil Cotton Bowl and the John Hancock Bowl were the specific 
sporting events considered by the Service. The Service decided that the signs 
and memorabilia associated with the events, and bearing the name of the 
businesses, were tantamount to valuable advertising for the businesses. A rather 
benign example is given in the following news item: 
Forget about getting a building named after yourself. The cash-strapped 
Scripps Institution of Oceanography is offering what might be an even 
better deal to someone looking to make a mark in history: A rare 
hydrothermal vent worm will forever be emblazoned with your name if 
you fork over $50,000. For those on a smaller budget, a mere $15,000 
will land you in the annals of marine biology as the namesake of an 
orange, speckled nudibranch, also known as a sea slug. 
Randy Dotinga, Want to Name a Sea Slug? A Nonprofit Might Let You., 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jun. 23, 2008, at 14, available at 
http://features.csmonitor.com/environment/2008/06/25/want-to-name-a-sea-
slug-a-nonprofit-might-let-you. Members of the scientific community look 
askance at the name-for-money game as compromising, but scientific 
institutions undergoing financial crises feel compelled to play the game. 
Every year there‘s a little bit less money to go around . . . . Institutions 
that rely on federal funds to keep their research going are finding it 
much tougher to get that money and are having to get creative in either 
finding other sources or rethinking what kinds of research they do. 
Id. (quoting Kei Koizumi, director of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science‘s Research & Development budget and policy 
program). Professors whose office doors are graced with a metal plaque 
appearing to name the office for some august donor are reminded of the game on 
a daily basis.   
91 Examples are ―donor acknowledgments‖ that may appear on brochures 
or invitations announcing a nonprofit event supported by named donors. 
92 See Fishman, supra note 1. 
93 Under the statute, nonprofits can receive revenues from sponsorships 
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permit a limited amount of exposure for the sponsor as long as it 
does not amount to ―advertising.‖ 
Advertising revenues are another form of nonprofit/for-profit 
collaboration. Typical examples are for-profit advertising revenues 
generated by nonprofit publications.
94 
Advertising income is often 
a necessary supplement for financing nonprofit publications. 
Subscription income alone rarely generates enough money to 
sustain an educational, professional or scholarly journal. But courts 
have not found the apparent necessity of advertising revenues 
sufficient reason for these revenues to escape UBIT. UBIT 
analyzes nonprofit revenues under a three-part test: 
1. Is the activity generating the revenue a ―trade or 
business?‖ If not, there is no tax. If it is a trade or business, 
2. Is it ―regularly carried on?‖ If not, there is no tax. If it is 
a trade or business regularly carried on, 
3. Is it ―substantially related‖ to the organization‘s exempt 
purposes? If it is, there is no tax. If not, UBIT applies and 
the income will be taxed at business income tax rates.
95
 
―Trades or businesses‖ are considered to be activities intended 
to generate profit.
96
 ―Regularly carried on‖ looks to the regularity 
with which for-profit enterprises carry on the activity.
97
 Both are 
relatively straightforward tests. The ―substantially related‖ test is 
                                                        
without income tax consequences (UBIT) as long as the sponsor‘s return benefit 
consists of nothing more than the public identification of its name, symbol or 
other identifying information along with other ―insubstantial‖ benefits, defined 
as benefits that are valued at no more than 2% of the sponsorship contribution. 
Based upon those parameters, ―name the species‖ fundraisers for scientific 
nonprofits, like Scripps Institution of Oceanography, can escape UBIT for the 
$15,000 it will receive from a donor who, in turn, can get a sea slug named for 
him. Dotinga, supra note 90, at 14. 
94 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 847 
(1986) (rejecting a per se rule to tax all commercial revenue from 
advertisements for tax-exempt journals but insisting that advertising revenues 
were taxable income). 
95 Internal Revenue Service, Unrelated Business Income Defined, 
http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=96104,00.html (last visited Mar. 1, 
2009). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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somewhat more difficult to grasp and has been interpreted by 
Treasury‘s regulations to mean that the business income must 
―contribute importantly‖ to the nonprofit mission of the charity, 
and the contribution must be more than revenues.
98  
Under that 
analysis, advertising will usually fail the ―substantially related 
test,‖ but not as a per se rule.99 Nonetheless, UBIT income from 
advertising will not cause the entire mission-driven enterprise in 
which it is generated to fail the UBIT test. Rather, Congress has 
adopted the Service‘s ―fragmentation‖ test by which the two 
sources of income (subscription fees and advertising revenues, for 
example) are to be treated separately.
100
 The ―contribute 
importantly‖ and ―fragmentation‖ rules also apply to other forms 
of business income that is a part of, but not subsumed by, the 
charitable activity.
101 
A final example of commonly structured collaborative 
activities between nonprofits and for-profits and their UBIT 
implications are revenues generated ―passively‖ by the nonprofit 
for some benefit it confers upon a business. Common examples are 
affinity credit cards (credit cards that bear the name and/or logo of 
a nonprofit—like a university) or rentals of the nonprofits‘ 
membership lists. Generally, UBIT has excluded from its purview 
passive investment income.
102
 Passive investment income has 
traditionally encompassed income generated by investments in for-
profit businesses (dividends and capital gains on sales of securities 
unless the securities are leveraged), rents (limited to rental income 
from real estate and from personal property but only if it is 
identified within the real estate rental agreement and is incidental 
to it) and royalties (limited to income generated from revenues for 
                                                        
98 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (2006). 
99 See Fraternal Order of Police Ill. State Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. 
Comm‘r, 87 T.C. 747, 756 (1986) (finding that advertising was ―obviously 
conducted with a profit motive‖). 
100 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified at 
26 U.S.C. § 513 (c)). 
101 Examples include commercial products sold in a museum gift shop 
(taxable income) along with art-related items (nontaxable income). See Rev. 
Rul. 73-105, 19731 C.B. 264. 
102 See generally I.R.C. § 512 (a)–(b) (2006). 
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the right to use intangible property, like copyrights and 
trademarks).
103 
 
Assuming that a nonprofit passes § 501(c)(3) muster, and that 
UBIT has done a good job of properly carving out commercial 
activity not entitled to the income tax exemption,
104 
the challenges 
to this type of commercial activity (collaborative efforts totally 
unrelated to the exempt purpose of the nonprofit) are: 
a. Do they compromise the nonprofit‘s reputation or its 
credibility and; 
b. To what extent is their provenance to be found in a 
public policy dominated by ideological considerations at 
the expense of practical considerations. That is to say, are 
nonprofits driven to embrace all kinds of fundraising 
gimmicks because government services and support have 
been so severely curtailed?; 
c. A related issue is whether these entrepreneurial 
gymnastics contribute to ―mission drift‖ by ineluctably 
introducing a partial ―mission shift.‖ More pointedly, does 
fundraising become a dominant mission of the nonprofit 
when traditional sources of income prove inadequate? 
C. Type 3 
A third type of structure for generating nonprofit revenues 
from commercial activity is situated between the fee-for-services 
or substantially related businesses that are integral to the 
nonprofit‘s operation (type 1) and the occasional collaborations 
with businesses that are extraneous to the charitable mission and its 
operations (type 2). In type 3 structures, the nonprofit seeks a 
closer connection with an unrelated business but tries to avoid 
                                                        
103 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-1 (1976), 1.512(b)-1(a) to (b) (1992); Sierra 
Club, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1532 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the 
passivity requirement as it applies to rents such as mailing list rentals and 
―royalties‖ from affinity credit cards).   
104 For a challenge to UBIT, see Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an 
Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 
(2007).  
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being subsumed by it. Joint ventures, either of the contractual 
variety or those deemed to be partnerships, are common examples 
of this type of income-generating structure. In the United States, 
most well publicized instances of this sort of commercial activity 
occur in the health care industry.
105 
Over time, a variety of joint 
venture structures have evolved and the I.R.S. has developed a less 
rigid, more nuanced approach to evaluating the tax law 
consequences of these structures.
106 
Ultimately the Service is 
                                                        
105 Other industries where joint ventures have proved to be attractive 
structures for financial support include low income housing nonprofits and 
higher education joint ventures. Judy Kindell, IRS & T.J. Sullivan, Gardner, 
Carton & Douglas, IRS‘ Judy Kindell Discusses Joint Ventures after Rev. Rul. 
2004-51, Remarks Before the Annual Tax Program of American Health 
Lawyers Association (Oct. 21, 2004), in 10 EO TAX J. 40 (2005). An example of 
a joint venture of a contractual nature in higher education was the contract 
between the University of California at Irvine and Capella University, an online 
for-profit university, in which Capella paid U.C. Irvine $500 per student referred 
to it. While considered legal by the U.S. Department of Education, the 
arrangement met with criticisms that it compromised the reputation and integrity 
of the public university and raised conflict-of-interest issues. Paul Basken, U. of 
California Campus Benefits from Referring Students to Profit College, Sept. 28, 
2007, available at http://www.calstate.edu/pa/clips2007/september/28sept/ 
refer.shtml. 
106 See NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra, note 20, at 711–43 (providing a 
lucid review of the evolution of joint venture forms and the Service‘s evolving 
attitude toward them). One typical illustration of joint ventures that emerged in 
the 1980s in the health care industry was the ―whole charity‖ merger, in which a 
§ 501(c)(3) hospital would transfer all of its assets and activities to a joint 
venture business entity in exchange for an interest in the new entity, while a for-
profit business would contribute cash to receive a similar ownership interest in 
the entity. Courts ruled that the nonprofit retained its tax-exempt status as a 
§ 501(c) organization only if it maintained dominant control over policy issues 
in the operation of the new (joint venture) entity. See, e.g., St. David‘s Health 
Care Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003). That is to say, the 
charitable mission of the nonprofit, not wealth maximization, must be the 
prevailing concern of the joint venture. Id. at 237–38. Thus, the issue of control 
can jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the nonprofit and cause it to be 
subsumed within a dominantly profit-driven enterprise.  
 Complex legal structures can hide the reality of power retained by the for-
profit entity. And that should not surprise us. When nonprofit organizations 
partner with for-profit businesses, relative bargaining power inherently resides 
in the for-profit enterprise. In St. David’s, the court stated, 
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The present case illustrates why, when a nonprofit organization forms a 
partnership with a for-profit entity, courts should be concerned about 
the relinquishment of control. St. David‘s, by its own account, entered 
the partnership with HCA [the for-profit company] out of financial 
necessity (to obtain revenues needed for it to stay afloat). HCA, by 
contrast, entered the partnership for reasons of financial convenience 
(to enter a new market). The starkly different financial position of these 
two parties at the beginning of their partnership negotiations 
undoubtedly affected their relative bargaining strength. Because St. 
David‘s ―needed‖ this partnership more than HCA, St. David‘s may 
have been willing to acquiesce to many (if not most) of HCA‘s 
demands for the Final Partnership Agreement. In the process, of course, 
St. David‘s may not have been able to ensure that its partnership with 
HCA would continually (sic.) provide a ―public benefit‖ as opposed to 
a private benefit for HCA. 
Id. at 247. Another form of joint venture that was developed was called 
―ancillary‖ because the charity, itself, was not integrated within the joint 
venture, but rather maintained its separate status and partnered with a for-profit 
in an ―ancillary‖ business venture by transferring part of its assets, services or 
money to the venture. See Rev. Rul. 04-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974. The Service lent 
its imprimatur to ancillary joint ventures under the same basic control guidelines 
it has maintained for ―whole charity‖ joint ventures. Id. This revenue ruling 
involved a 50-50 joint venture between a university and a for-profit company. 
The venture was a distance learning program in which the university controlled 
the curriculum and the faculty appointments while the for-profit contributed its 
expertise in how to run a distance program through interactive video. The 
Service approved the joint venture under both the exclusivity test and UBIT in 
spite of the 50-50 structure because the university retained control of the exempt 
purpose: education. Id. Where the nonprofit retains control over a § 501(c)(3) 
purpose, the Service‘s analysis is fairly straightforward. This is particularly the 
case where the joint venture represents only a small part of the operations of the 
nonprofit (an ―ancillary‖ operation). However, where the expertise each entity 
brings to the venture is the same (a for-profit hospital and a nonprofit hospital; a 
for-profit university and a nonprofit university) then the control issue is more 
complex and ownership shares and managerial power become more important, 
and the legal outcome for the nonprofit less predictable. Complexity arises not 
just from the substantial ownership and management provisions but from the 
structure under which the venture operates (LLC; general partnership; limited 
partnership; joint venture of the partnership model vs. joint venture of the 
contract model) because state governance laws may differ and ―in many cases 
the critical questions are not addressed by state laws, regulations or cases.‖ 
Kindell & Sullivan, supra, note 105, at 33. For a discussion of the Service‘s 
informal guidelines for LLC exempt organizations, see Bradley T. Borden, 
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concerned with whether the joint venture, as it is structured and 
operated, is primarily driven by a tax-exempt purpose 
(―exclusivity‖ rule); 2) engaged in businesses not substantially 
related to that purpose (UBIT); and 3) whether distribution of 
profits violates the private benefit constraint (―non-distribution‖ or 
―no private inurement‖ rule).107 
To be sure, joint ventures can be a lucrative source of revenues, 
but they come with certain risks: 
1. The risk that the nonprofit might lose its exempt status; 
2. Or that its gain from nonexempt sources of income might 
be significantly reduced by UBIT; 
3. Or that the culture of the organization might shift away 
from one driven by charitable ends to one driven by 
profitable means (a subtle but discernible transformation in 
the organization‘s culture usually called ―mission drift‖); 
4. Or that its association‘s close relationship with a 
business partner might result in some loss of reputation. 
D. Type 4 
A fourth type of business activity is a structural alternative to 
the mission drift, reputational and regulatory risks associated with 
type 3 joint ventures. Through structural formalities, parent-
subsidiary arrangements help the nonprofit (―parent‖ organization) 
distance itself from the for-profit enterprise that sustains it.
108  
Type 
4 is a clear instance of the deference courts have traditionally 
shown to the formal organization structures businesses elect to 
form under corporate governance laws.
109 
 As discussed earlier in 
this Article, the general rule is that courts will honor the corporate 
                                                        
Limited Liability Companies as Exempt Organizations, 33 ESTS. GIFTS & TRS. J. 
150 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1142924.  
107 See supra p. 111. 
108 In addition to separating itself from the subsidiary business to protect 
itself from the risks associated with type 3 structures, nonprofit parent 
organizations might also reap tax and liability exposure advantages from the use 
of subsidiary businesses they control.  
109 See generally supra Part II.B.2. 
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formalities of state corporate governance laws that separate a 
corporation from its owners and affiliates against appeals by 
creditors to ―pierce the corporate veil‖ of limited liability (that 
generally shields owners and affiliates from the liabilities of a 
corporation) unless the case reveals that the corporation‘s structure 
protects fraud or similar wrongdoing which the shield of limited 
liability was not intended to protect.
110 
  
In the very different legal context of the federal code, courts 
have adopted the same kind of deference.
111 
The corporate ―shield‖ 
between a for-profit subsidiary and its nonprofit owner will not be 
―pierced‖: they will not be treated as one entity and the business 
activities of the subsidiary will not be attributed to the charity 
absent probative evidence of the same kinds of deception that lead 
courts under state corporate governance laws to pierce the 
corporate veil. Nonetheless, Congress has considered eliminating 
the shield for a controlled subsidiary of a nonprofit parent 
organization and that legislative policy change may yet be 
realized.
112 
In any event and in the absence of that kind of 
legislation, subsidiary businesses have become an increasingly 
prevalent venue for sustaining the charitable projects of nonprofits. 
Michael H. Shuman and Merrian Fuller have described the 
phenomenon.
113 
In type 4 organizations, a business entity (the 
subsidiary, typically a for-profit corporation) simply runs its 
business and distributes net profits (dividends) to its nonprofit 
owner (the parent corporation that owns its shares). A successful 
example of this model is the Used Book Café in New York, a for-
profit, wholly owned subsidiary of its parent corporation, Housing 
                                                        
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., Molive Props., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943). But 
see Orange County Agric. Soc‘y v. Comm‘r, 893 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1990). 
112 See generally NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 710–11, 
744–50 (discussing the Draft Report of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the 
House Ways and Means Committee on proposed revisions of UBIT, 100th 
Cong. 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1988)). Fishman and Schwarz comment, ―This and 
other proposals were never enacted, but the controversy over complex structures 
lingers as a major policy issue in the law of tax-exempt organizations.‖ Id. at 
710. 
113 Shuman & Fuller, supra note 88, at 13–14.  
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Works, a nonprofit association that assists homeless people with 
HIV/AIDS. Shuman & Fuller have described the relationship 
between the two entities this way: 
Used Book Café . . . an independent bookstore . . . enjoys 
regular visits from leading agents and publishers in the city 
and boasts a fabulous events calendar that reads like a 
Who‘s Who of contemporary writers and musicians. 
What‘s truly revolutionary about the café, however, is that 
[since 2004] the business, along with sister thrift shops, 
provided [annually] more than $2 million to its parent 
nonprofit, Housing Works . . . .
114
 
This fourth option seems to offer a ―new paradigm‖ for 
commercial activity by charities without the downside risks of the 
other three options. The new paradigm separates the for-profit 
activity from the nonprofit mission by establishing a subsidiary 
business entity, owned by, but legally separate from, the nonprofit 
parent corporation. The legal separation of the two entities 
alleviates some of the problems associated with the other forms of 
commercial activity by nonprofits. Because the nonprofit has no 
direct legal control over the subsidiary‘s operations,115 there is no 
compromise of the nonprofit‘s reputation.116 Because the 
subsidiary‘s business income is taxed before it distributes its net 
profits to the nonprofit parent, there is no UBIT tax problem that 
could arise if the nonprofit generated the business income itself.
117
 
Because the subsidiary exerts no control over the parent nonprofit, 
                                                        
114 Id. at 13. 
115 Shareholders (owners) of corporations do not run the operations of the 
corporation under state corporate governance laws. Rather, the company is 
managed by executives hired by the Board of Directors who are accountable to 
it. See generally JESSE CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON, 
BASIC NORMS AND DUTIES FOR MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 55 (Coth ed., Aspen 2004). 
116 By stark contrast, the AMA‘s lucrative endorsement of Sunbeam‘s 
products is a clear example of commercial activity that was damaging to the 
nonprofit‘s reputation. See supra note 89. 
117 However, collaborations between nonprofits and for-profit businesses, 
along with fee-for-services, can result in UBIT exposure. See supra notes 81–86 
and accompanying text. 
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there is no business dominance or control problem of the kind 
associated with joint ventures and other types of partnerships.
118
 
The business entity simply runs its separate commercial activity 
and distributes net profits (dividends) to its nonprofit owner. This 
model of a nonprofit sustaining itself through commercial activity 
appears to be an idea whose time has come; the current era of anti-
government bias necessitates that nonprofits expand their services 
while simultaneously meeting the increased financial requirements 
of an ever-expanding nonprofit sector without tarnishing its 
reputation, shifting nonprofits‘ attention away from their charitable 
mission or jeopardizing their legal status. That said, there are 
downside risks to this model of entrepreneurship as well. 
Unlike the other three options, the parent-subsidiary model 
appears to pose none of the legal, reputational or mission drift 
problems because the structured separation of the entities seems to 
protect the nonprofit from any taint of profit-driven motives. 
However, even this otherwise promising model may compromise a 
fundamental public interest. Nonprofits, under § 501(c)(3), are 
deemed to be ―public benefit‖ organizations.119 That is, they 
supply some important service to the public by their charitable 
works. And this notion of ―public benefit‖ is often used to justify 
the various tax advantages the law affords § 501(c)(3) charitable 
organizations. As explained in Part II, above, tax advantages 
supply the consideration for the nonprofits and act as the ―quid pro 
quo‖ for the ―public benefit‖ society derives from their charitable 
works.
120
 But who determines which specific projects from the vast 
array of societal problems that might be addressed should be 
selected? Should the public have any voice in these kinds of 
decisions? In that regard, and as addressed in Part II, the parent-
subsidiary model can be seen as analogous to private foundations 
because it raises similar concerns. Congress originally treated 
private foundations like other § 501(c)(3) organizations.
121
 But in 
the 1960s, Congress became concerned that private foundations 
                                                        
118 See I.R.C. §§ 512(a)–(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-(1)(a) (2006). 
119 See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). 
120 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006). 
121 Marsh, supra note 63, at 138–39. 
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were deriving ―public benefit‖ status without any input or 
influence from the public itself.
122
 In a democracy, Congress 
reasoned, the citizens at large (or, at least the relevant community 
of citizens) should have a voice in determining what kind of 
nonprofit activity is a ―public benefit.‖ Congress thus ratcheted up 
the regulation regime for monitoring and directing the activities of 
private (grant-making) foundations and it diminished the 
unfettered power of ―operating foundations‖ to act without public 
influence.
123
 Congress did so by requiring operating foundations to 
accede to public opinion about the selection of their public benefit 
projects. Public opinion enters the decision-making process in two 
ways: operating foundations must put a certain number of outsiders 
(members of the public) on their boards and a certain percent of 
their capital must come from public donations.
124
 
Like these foundations, a self-sustaining nonprofit that can 
generate all of its financial support from its own for-profit 
subsidiary runs the risk of being charged with a kind of solipsism: 
it no longer needs public financial support in the form of individual 
donations or government and institutional grants. Thus, there is no 
longer any financial incentive for the nonprofit to reach out to 
constituents in the community to participate, as members of the 
governing board or as donors, in formulating the nonprofit‘s 
policies or in monitoring its operations. Therefore, like a private 
foundation, within its self-selected mission it has inordinate power 
to decide which charitable projects most benefit the public. It 
seems reasonable to predict that, as was the case with private 
grant-making and operating foundations, their otherwise enviable 
position as self-sustaining will eventually subject them to public 
outcry, public scrutiny and government regulation. 
E. Type 5 
Certainly the most innovative of recent nonprofit efforts to 
                                                        
122 Id. at 148. 
123 See I.R.C. §§ 507–09 (2009) 
124 See NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 596, 753–54, 760–
62; ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 55, at 322–23. 
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engage in commercial activity in order to sustain their charitable 
activities is the ―social business‖ or ―social enterprise.‖ Charles 
King, speaking on behalf of the Social Enterprise Alliance, a group 
that advocates new venues for making nonprofits self-sustaining 
has said, ―What we are about . . . is the business of changing the 
entire paradigm by which not-for-profits operate and generate the 
capital they need to carry out their mission—a new paradigm based 
on sustainability and social entrepreneurship.‖125 Many new forms 
of commercial endeavors might logically be called ―social 
enterprises‖ but the most revolutionary form of the paradigm is a 
very specific kind of entrepreneurship: an organization (for profit 
or nonprofit) that identifies a disadvantaged segment or group in a 
population and seeks to transform (not merely ameliorate) the 
living conditions of that group by developing a sustainable 
commercial opportunity for them or by otherwise providing an exit 
route from an untenable situation. This form of a social business is 
distinguishable from a for-profit commercial enterprise because its 
mission is not to generate profit for its investors but to meet a 
―social objective‖ of transforming the capacity of underprivileged 
populations to escape poverty and other debilitating conditions.
126
 
At the same time, this form of social entrepreneurship can be 
distinguished from a traditional social services charity which seeks 
to aid and assist with funding that may derive from business profits 
(as well as from donations and grants) but not to transform the 
disadvantaged group through commercial enterprise. 
It should be emphasized, however, that this emergent form of 
self-sustaining organizations, like the competing terms for and 
definitions of the Third Sector, (―nonprofits,‖ the U.S. term; or 
―NGOs,‖ the E.U. term) may go by different names which 
generally describe the same kind of entity but may also imply 
distinct characteristics that make an analytical difference.
127  
Thus, 
                                                        
125 See Shuman & Fuller, supra note 113, at 13. 
126 See Muhammed Yunus, The Nobel Peace Prize 2006: Nobel Lecture, 13 
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 267 (2007). 
127 See Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3, at 357; see also Jean Proulx, 
Denis Bourque & Sebastien Savard, The Government - Third Sector Interface in 
Quebec, 18 VOLUNTAS: INT‘L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 293, 295 n.1 
(2007) (noting that the U.S. term of ―nonprofit‖ and the E.U. term of ―NGO‖ 
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while the most revolutionary form is described above by the 
narrow definition of social business or social enterprise so as to 
distinguish it from typical business forms in the for-profit sector 
and from other kinds of commercial activities by nonprofits, the 
larger context of empirical research describes two broader but 
somewhat different perspectives on social businesses: the U.S. 
model and the E.U. model. It may be instructive to describe these 
two broader definitions in order to clarify the challenges social 
businesses face.
128 
Both the U.S. understanding and the E.U. 
perspective view social businesses as nongovernmental, market-
based approaches to address social issues.‖129 Empirical studies, 
however, indicate that the U.S. perspective emphasizes the 
―revenue generation‖ aspect of social enterprise while the 
European tradition emphasizes a ―social economy‖ or cooperative 
aspect of social enterprise. The European tradition is foreign to 
U.S. sensibilities but deeply rooted in the historical antecedents of 
the European model.
130  
Thus, social enterprise in Europe can be 
seen as an outgrowth of the cooperative movement—an anti-
authoritarian labor movement. In Europe, the emphasis is on 
participation in governance by the enterprise‘s beneficiaries and on 
social and employment objectives, which goes well beyond the 
U.S. emphasis on revenue generation.
131 
  
Research also indicates that within the U.S., academia 
conceptualizes social enterprise somewhat differently: scholars, 
especially within leading business schools, tend to situate social 
enterprise within the category of for-profit businesses that engage, 
                                                        
connote two different research traditions: ―‗an American tradition stressing non-
lucrativity‘‖ and ―‗a European tradition stressing collective entrepreneurship and 
identifying the third sector with social economy‘‖ (references omitted)). 
128 An excellent article illuminating the differences between the U.S. and 
E.U. traditions is Janelle A. Kerlin, Social Enterprise in the United States and 
Europe: Understanding and Learning from the Differences, 17 VOLUNTAS: 
INT‘L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 247 (2006). 
129 Id. at 247. 
130 Id. at 25153. 
131 Id. at 250. For an historical perspective on the evolution of the European 
model, see generally Heydemann, supra note 6, at 20, 22 (noting how 
differences in national experiences help to explain differences in national 
models of nonprofit associations). 
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at some level, with social issues or causes. Practitioners, on the 
other hand, think of social businesses as organized under 
§ 501(c)(3) operating charities.
132 
 The practitioners‘ version of the 
U.S. model seems to fit the use of social enterprise in the 1970s 
when nonprofits developed businesses to generate jobs for the 
unemployed. That model was expanded during the decade of the 
1970s when the economy suffered a downturn and the government 
began to downsize. To make up for shortages in financing from 
government, nonprofits expanded the model to sustain their social 
services work during that decade. Today, the social 
entrepreneurship model continues to expand, taking different forms 
and adopting different goals: nonprofit vs. for-profit; job-creation 
vs. mission support; revenue-generation vs. community 
development or transformation of the living conditions of a 
targeted group, and so forth.
133 
Like the four other types of commercial activity by nonprofits, 
the social business has proven to be an effective way for charities 
to sustain themselves and their missions in an era where 
government downsizing has deprived them of an important source 
of support. But like the other four types of (entirely or partially) 
self-sustaining nonprofits, they too face challenges and risks. 
Those risks and challenges may vary with the choice among the 
different social enterprise models identified above. An obvious 
                                                        
132 Kerlin, supra note 128, at 251. 
133 Examples of the various kinds of social businesses abound. Perhaps the 
most famous are the Grameen businesses pioneered by Muhammad Yunus who 
won the Nobel Peace Prize for his microcredit bank Grameen Bank, which he 
founded along with Grameen Shakti of Grameen Energy, which has brought 
renewable energy to Bangladesh; Grameen Kalyan (Grameen Welfare) bringing 
affordable healthcare to the poor in Bangladesh, which has spawned a network 
of for-profit and nonprofit social businesses dedicated to transforming the health 
of the poor; and recently Grameen Danone, a social business partnership with 
Groupe Danone, the French yogurt conglomerate, which provides low cost 
highly nutritious food for the poor. For an overview of Yunus‘ pioneering and 
very successful work in social businesses, see generally MUHAMMAD YUNUS, 
CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY: SOCIAL BUSINESS AND THE FUTURE OF 
CAPITALISM (Public Affairs-Perseus Books 2007). See also PHIL SMITH & ERIC 
THURMAN, A BILLION BOOTSTRAPS: MICROCREDIT, BAREFOOT BANKING AND 
THE BUSINESS SOLUTION FOR ENDING POVERTY (McGraw-Hill 2007). 
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example is the form the entrepreneurs select: when creating a 
nonprofit social enterprise, they must consider whether or to what 
extent their enterprise will be jeopardized by the exclusivity test or 
by UBIT taxation discussed in Section A of Part II above.
134 
 If, on 
the other hand, they elect to form the enterprise as a for-profit, 
while they will avoid the limitations of the tax code for 
§ 501(c)(3), they may run the risks of mission drift and diminution 
of the credibility and reputation that § 501(c)(3) organizations 
appear to enjoy.
135 
Moreover, scholars have identified the 
following problems confronting every form of social enterprise in 
the U.S.: 
1. Exclusion of Specific Groups  
Because private sector organizations have the latitude to be 
selective in their choice of form, mission and beneficiaries, some 
groups of individuals may be overlooked by a social business 
model driven by revenue generation. Unlike both the government, 
which is constrained by constitutional
 
and statutory requirements 
mandating a more even-handed approach, and the European model, 
which is historically premised upon community development and 
the ideal of inclusion of outlier groups, the U.S. model may result 
in the unintended consequence of exclusion or—at least—
inadvertent omission.
136 
 
2. Risks to Civil Society  
Nonprofit scholarship is replete with paeans about the 
contribution the nonprofit sector makes to civil society by 
developing ―social capital.‖137 Scholars argue that social capital 
                                                        
134 See the discussion of ―type 1‖ self-sustaining nonprofits at notes 81–88 
and accompanying text. 
135 See supra notes 101106 and accompanying text. 
136 Kerlin, supra note 128, at 258. 
137 Id. at 258 n.6: ―Social Capital includes the social norms of trust, 
cooperation, and reciprocity that develop through positive citizen interaction and 
which undergirds the effective functioning of democracy and a market 
economy.‖ (citing E. Backman & S.R. Smith, Health Organizations, Unhealthy 
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development (and, with it, the vibrancy of civil society) may be 
diminished by the social enterprise movement in the following 
respects: 
a. ―[A] growing focus on the bottom line may lead 
organizations to abandon less efficient practices that 
strengthen social capital, such as running a volunteer 
program.‖138  
b. As organizations, like social businesses, become self-
sustaining they may discover they do not need to rely on 
―traditional stakeholders and networks such as private 
donors, members, community volunteers and other 
community organizations with the result that opportunities 
to promote social capital are lost.‖ 139  
c. Finally, the mission shift to revenue generation may lead 
to a shift in board membership from community leaders 
and volunteers to financial experts and business advisors.
140
  
3. Lack of Oversight Assistance and Public Policy Direction 
From the U.S. Government  
―In the United States virtually no new policy has been created 
over the past 50 years to accommodate the business activities of 
the growing number of nonprofits involved in social enterprise.‖141 
In that regard, the U.S. lags significantly behind E.U. countries. 
Beginning with Italy in 1991, legislation has made provision for, 
and given guidance to, social business forms in Belgium (1995), 
                                                        
Communities?, 10 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 355 (2000)). De 
Tocqueville was perhaps the first to recognize the salutary effect of grass-roots 
nonprofits on developing the skills to sustain a strong civil society. See Barbara 
K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a 
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 555, 557 (1998). 
138 Kerlin, supra, note 128, at 258. 
139 Id. But see Fishman, supra note 1, at 605 (―Public benefit corporations 
arose originally in England as for-profit companies that provided a social 
benefit.‖). The U.K.‘s new Office of the Third Sector uses that definition for 
social businesses. Id. at 601. 
140 Kerlin, supra note 128, at 258. 
141 Id. at 253. 
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Portugal (1998), Greece (1999), France (2001) and most recently 
the U.K. (2005).
142
 In describing the British model, Professor 
Fishman notes the hybrid nature of the social business: it has both 
a charitable mission and a revenue-generation mission. Thus, it 
represents a new form of social organization and should, perhaps, 
be considered a ―‗fourth sector‘ of society.‖143   
Social business has a proven track record of revenue generation 
for charitable causes but it obviously carries with it significant 
risks. The risks to the sector and to society invite legislative reform 
to define and give direction to this new sector. The social 
enterprise phenomenon, however, is only one example of the need 
to ―rethink‖ the regulation of nonprofit associations as Fishman144 
and other experts have suggested.
145 
 
                                                        
142 Id. at 254. For an expanded discussion of the ―CIC‖ (Community 
Interest Company) under the new British statute, see Fishman, supra note 1, at 
60003. He notes that differences between the U.S. model and the U.K.‘s CIC 
are an asset lock and a partial distribution constraint. Id. at 606. 
143 Fishman, supra note 1, at 598. 
144 Id. at 60607. Fishman has suggested that much of the regulatory 
regime that polices the lapses in fiduciary obligations by nonprofits should be 
returned to the state and local level. Id. But he also observes that the emergence 
of the social enterprise model itself (in all its varieties and permutations) 
challenges us to broaden our reformist perspective. Id. at 60307. 
145 Examples of scholarship counseling regulatory reform include Ellen P. 
Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation of 
Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007); David A. Brennen, 
The Commerciality Doctrine as Applied to the Charitable Tax Exemption for 
Homes for the Aged: State and Local Perspectives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 833 
(2007); Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through 
the Gaps Between Law and Practice, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 521 (2007); Marion 
R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit 
Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 609 (2007); Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3; Garry W. 
Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State 
Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113 (2007); Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 
and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625 (2007); Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795 
(2007); Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus 
of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI. KENT L. REV. 
559 (2005); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit 
Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893 
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IV. REFORMING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR TO RESTRAIN ITS 
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY: AN ASSESSMENT 
There can be no doubt that a legislative reappraisal of the 
nonprofit sector is overdue.
146
 The emergence of the social 
enterprise model, alone, signals the need for a reappraisal. But 
social businesses are only one example of the types of commercial 
vehicles charities are employing to sustain themselves and their 
missions today. Furthermore, taken as a whole these forays into 
business ventures now represent a large portion of nonprofit 
finances today: 
Data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics at 
The Urban Institute suggest that social enterprise [in the 
broad sense of revenue-generating ventures of all kinds] 
continues to rise in the United States. The commercial 
activities of nonprofits were tracked over 20 years (1982-
2002) using a database of financial information that 
nonprofits with $25,000 and over in revenue file with the 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Commercial revenue 
included program service revenue (fee-for-service), net 
income from sales of goods, net income from special events 
and activities and membership dues and assessments for 
which members received comparable benefits. Analysis 
found that over the 20 year period, commercial revenue 
was not only consistently the largest income producer but 
                                                        
(2007). But see Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field 
or Titling a Level One, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 (2007) (demonstrating that 
UBIT could be an example of regulation that goes too far and puts nonprofits at 
an unfair disadvantage). 
146 Congress has tacitly acknowledged as much in hearings held recently, 
although a reform consensus has yet to emerge. See Overview of the Tax-Exempt 
Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005), 
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode 
=detail&hearing=400; Charities and Charitable Giving: Proposals for Reform: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. (2005), available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing030505.htm; Elizabeth Kingsley & 
John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Collide 
in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 10 EO 
JOURNAL 186 (2005).  
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also that it grew substantially. From 1982 to 2002, the 
commercial revenue of nonprofits increased by 219%, 
private contributions by 197% and government grants by 
169%. Most significantly, it also grew as a share of total 
revenue. In 1982 commercial income made up 48.1% of 
nonprofit revenue but by 2002 it accounted for 57.6%. 
Meanwhile, private contributions only grew from 19.9% to 
22.2% and government grants from 17.0% to 17.2%.
147 
 
These studies mentioned above conclusively demonstrate that 
for-profit activity in the nonprofit sector is expanding at an 
accelerated rate and that the decline in government services and 
financial support has at the very least exacerbated this trend, if it 
has not been a principal driver of it. 
Reform-minded scholars are unquestionably right to advocate a 
retrospective analysis of the sector with a view to its overhaul. 
Leading scholars should also persuade us that the narrow attention 
that the media and Congress are paying to perennial scandals as the 
focus of reform legislation is hopelessly short-sighted and 
inadequate.
148
 The broader agendas advocated by scholars will 
surely result in better outcomes.
149 
  
                                                        
147 Kerlin, supra note 128, at 252 (citations omitted). 
148 See Fishman, supra note 1, at 572, 587. ―Additional regulation merely 
increases the burdens of nonprofit status, or in economic jargon, transaction 
costs, at the expense of focusing on mission.‖ Id. at 568. Fishman also suggests 
that there is a need to get beyond these ―erroneous assumptions‖ and 
―incremental approaches.‖ Id. at 567. 
149 See, e.g., id. at 567, 570, 57479, 584 (arguing for a reassessment of the 
―proper scope of the 501(c)(3) universe,‖ a ―redefinition of the charitable 
sector,‖ and a shift from federal regulation of the fiduciary obligations of 
nonprofit boards and managers to state and local authorities). See also Brennan, 
supra note 145 (discussing the abandonment of the historical understanding of 
what it meant to be a ―charitable‖ institution as it pertains, especially, to 
eldercare facilities and using eldercare as an exemplar of how to parse the 
commerciality doctrine in order to make a useful distinction between exempt 
and nonexempt organizations for purposes of assessing local property taxes); 
Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1 (advocating a reassessment 
of the proper role of the federal tax code as it relates to charities); Fremont-
Smith, supra note 145 (surveying the current legislative landscape of reformist 
proposals); Jenkins, supra note 145 (presenting an empirical study of how state 
governance law for nonprofits is shaped primarily by private law making 
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In this Article, I have argued that, as a preliminary matter, the 
reformist perspective should be enlarged to include an appreciation 
of the impact that a pro-business ideology has had on public policy 
choices in contemporary America, and an understanding of the 
effects that this ideological policy driver has had for the nonprofit 
sector, the government sector, and ultimately the representative 
democracy of which they are a part. An adequate analysis of those 
phenomena invites both quantitative and qualitative research 
projects.  
A preliminary assessment of the evidence currently available 
can be summarized as follows: At a minimum, circumstantial 
evidence suggests that anti-government fervor in recent decades 
has led to the downsizing of government and either an outsourcing 
of many of its programs or a privatization of them.
150
 Especially in 
the social services sector, nonprofits have tried to meet the societal 
need created by the downsizing phenomenon with efforts to 
expand their own services. This, in turn, has led nonprofits to seek 
new sources of income to support their expansion. These new 
sources have included government contracting through 
privatization and, especially, commercial activity.
151
 What have we 
observed from that experience? We can acknowledge that the 
success of commercial activity, in its various forms, has provided 
the capital necessary to fill (at least partially) the infrastructure gap 
left by government downsizing. That recognition is important 
because a reform program seeking to curtail perceived excesses of 
entrepreneurial activity by nonprofits that fails to appreciate this 
                                                        
groups—ALI; ABA; NCCUSL—with minimal input from nonprofit 
associations themselves and the consequences of that for the reform movement 
in nonprofit law); Knoll, supra note 145 (demonstrating that UBIT unfairly 
burdens the nonprofit sector‘s commercial activities); Reiser, There Ought to Be 
a Law, supra note 145 (demonstrating that legislative reform of nonprofit 
regulation at both the federal and state levels will be ineffectual because of the 
political reality that government enforcement systems at all levels of 
government are critically under-funded); Reiser, Director Independence, supra 
note 145 (arguing that the ―best practices‖ model for for-profit corporate boards 
comprised of a majority of independent directors may be an inappropriate model 
for nonprofit boards because their situation is inapposite).  
150 See Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
151 Id. 
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point will surely confront the effects of unintended consequences. 
We can also observe, as an empirical fact, that the effort to engage 
in commercial enterprise to support nonprofit missions has inspired 
important innovative forms of associational hybrids, like the social 
business form.
152 
As reformers rethink the nonprofit sector, the 
characteristics and experiences of these new associational forms 
should be an invaluable resource. 
At the same time, there are significant downsides to the 
business activity of nonprofits. In this Article, I have observed that, 
in addition to the statutory hazards posed by commercialization in 
the sector, business ventures in all forms create other risks: mission 
drift; reputational hazards; and (as discussed below) the diminution 
of the sector‘s capacity to generate social capital requisite to the 
maintenance of a representative democracy. Taking a larger view, 
research suggests that, as a contiguous matter, the phenomenon we 
now observe in the nonprofit sector impacts the public sector in a 
                                                        
152 Among the surfeit of creative solutions developed by the nonprofit 
sector, the media has given attention to the following, which I include for 
purposes of illustration: 
1. Teach for America: a nonprofit organization that prepares graduates 
from elite colleges to teach underprivileged children. Among other 
things, it works in conjunction with the Knowledge is Power Program 
(KIPP), a network of charter schools dedicated to improving the 
educational opportunities for these children. Sam Dillon, 2 School 
Entrepreneurs Lead the Way on Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at 
A15. 
2. Farm Rescue: a volunteer organization that helps farmers hit by 
disasters to get back on their feet by supplying the agricultural labor 
required. Blake Nicholson, Businessman Creates Hope for Struggling 
U.S. Farmers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 2, 2008, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0702/p12s01-usgn.html. 
3. ShopRite Supermarket: a for-profit grocery store providing low cost 
nutritional food to inner city neighborhoods ―aimed at squashing 
obesity and related concerns such as heart disease and diabetes.‖ The 
project was initially funded by a loan from Pennsylvania‘s Fresh Food 
Financing Initiative and may be the first successful public-private 
program of its kind. Sarah More McCann, Wanted: Inner City 
Supermarkets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 26, 2008, available at 
http://features.csmonitor.com/innovation/2008/06/27/wanted-inner-
city-supermarkets. 
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negative way as well. As government has diminished its capacity 
to serve the community by outsourcing (contracting its programs to 
nonprofits and for-profits) or privatizing (abandoning) them, and 
as nonprofits have stepped in to fill the gap with resources 
generated by commercial activity, both the public sector and the 
nonprofit sector have suffered.  
Studies indicate several trends. First, the social capital that 
forms the matrix which binds the elements or factions of civil 
society and of representative democracies together is weakened.
153 
Privatization of government programs and services has burgeoned 
in the past quarter-century.
154
 Empirical studies of the phenomenon 
indicate that the dominance of these contractual arrangements 
weakens democratic decision-making,
155 
as well as the doctrine of 
state action and constitutional accountability in government.
156
 
Thus, representative democracy itself is weakened and with it the 
public‘s belief in government accountability and transparency.157 
Evidence shows privatization also weakens the nonprofit sector. 
                                                        
153 The idea of ―social capital‖ is nascent in the work of de Tocqueville and 
his observations that grass roots voluntary associations in the U.S. develop the 
organizational skills requisite to citizenship in a representative democracy, see 
Bucholtz, supra note 137 and accompanying text, and the work of James 
Madison and his observations about the importance of memberships in 
overlapping factions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). But the 
concept was famously developed by ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE 
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (Simon & Schuster 2000). 
There are two constituent categories of social capital: ―bridging social capital‖ 
(building ―norms of trust and reciprocity‖ among factions in society) and 
―bonding social capital‖ (developing ―norms of felt solidarity‖). Sheila Suess 
Kennedy & Wolfgang Bielefeld, Hollowing Out Civil Society? Government 
Contracting and Social Capital, DEMOCRACY & SOCIETY 6 (2004). Grass roots 
voluntary organizations are believed to foster both kinds of social capital. 
154 See Kennedy & Bielefeld, supra note 153, at 7 (―Government contracts 
in the United States now account for nearly 40% of all voluntary sector income, 
and by some estimates 80% of the income of social-service-providing 
nonprofits.‖). 
155 See Shelia S. Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action in the Era 
of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. 
L.J. 203, 204–08 (2001). 
156 Id. at 207. 
157 See id. 
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Nonprofit contracting parties become beholden to the terms of the 
contract and their contracting partners in the public sector, rather 
than to their boards and donors.
158 
Contracting with the 
government erodes the voluntariness of nonprofit organizations 
and, thereby, the social capital networks they are said to provide, 
just as it erodes the accountability and transparency of the 
government. Moreover, the dominance of the government as a 
contracting partner may create a financial dependency upon the 
government to sustain nonprofit projects, further compromising 
their status as members of a voluntary and independent sector, 
perhaps even ―stifling grass-roots advocacy efforts by private 
voluntary organizations.‖159 One has to ask whether America‘s 
infatuation with the business sector is worth that price. 
Second, commercialization also has a negative effect on the 
voluntary characteristic of the nonprofit sector. Like contracts with 
government agencies, studies have shown that commercial projects 
decrease active participation by volunteers.
160 
Voluntary 
contributions of work and finance are the sine qua non of nonprofit 
organizations and the foundational characteristic that develops 
social capital. Studies show that this vital element is weakened by 
both the privatization and the commercialization precipitated by 
government downsizing. 
Third, while the public and nonprofit sectors have suffered 
some injury from the phenomenon, the evidence suggests that the 
for-profit sector has enjoyed a distinct advantage from downsizing 
the public sector. As examples, the well-publicized contracts of 
                                                        
158 ―When nonprofit organizations contract with the State, they become 
accountable in ways that are qualitatively different from the accountability owed 
to board members and even donors.‖ Kennedy & Bielefeld, supra note 153, at 7. 
159 Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS 
LEARNED BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1997)); MATTHEW CRENSON & 
BENJAMIN GINSBURG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: HOW AMERICA SIDELINED ITS 
CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED THE PUBLIC (Johns Hopkins University Press 2002). 
160 See Bernard Enjolras, Commercialization of Voluntary Organizations 
and Members’ Participation: The Case of Norwegian Voluntary Sport 
Organizations, 2 DEMOCRACY & SOCIETY 8 (2004). This study chronicled the 
decline in volunteerism in proportion to the increase in commercial activity by 
the sports organizations and found that ―[t]here exists apparently a crowding out 
effect of voluntary work by commercial incomes.‖ Id. at 10. 
BUCHOLTZ_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:35 PM 
 DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD AND VICE VERSA 451 
Halliburton and Blackwater in the Bush administration‘s Iraq War 
have been enlightening.
161
 
Fourth, and finally, since much of the debate about downsizing 
and privatization centers on the extent to which government should 
provide a social safety net for its citizens, some attention should be 
paid to that complex issue as well. 
A useful place to access the available evidence is found in 
Jeffery Sachs‘ recent book Common Wealth.162 There he 
summarizes recent statistics that challenge the efficacy of a pro-
business ideology. He divides capitalist societies into three groups: 
1) ―social welfare societies‖ (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden); 2) ―mixed economies‖ (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands); and 3) ―(relatively) free-
market countries‖ (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom and the United States). These three groups 
represent the spectrum of government spending to provide citizens 
with a social safety net as a percent of national income (GNP). 
And he uses empirical evidence to answer two questions raised by 
the claims of a pro-business, anti-government ideology:  
1. Do strong social safety net programs threaten the 
economic strength of a capitalist society by ―under 
min[ing] market mechanisms and . . . distort[ing] the 
incentives vital to healthy economic growth and 
performance?‖163 
2. Are attempts to provide a safety net for the 
disadvantaged futile? 
                                                        
161 The publicity surrounding those contracts has been ubiquitous and needs 
no elaboration here, although Paul R. Verkuil gives the problem an interesting 
overview. PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY 
PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (Cambridge University Press 2007). Verkuil 
attempts to reintroduce pragmatism and balance to the debate over privatization 
and to analyze whether particular societal tasks should be assigned to a 
particular sector, using the outsourcing of military and related functions as his 
focus. Id.  
162 See generally JEFFERY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A 
CROWDED PLANET (The Penguin Press 2008). 
163 Id. at 257. 
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The research Sachs provides suggests that not only are the 
claims upon which these two questions are premised false but there 
is abundant evidence showing that the opposites appear to be true. 
Sachs argues that ―[t]he evidence suggests that the high social 
spending in the social-welfare states is indeed very effective in 
reducing poverty and inequality and in promoting health and 
prosperity . . . .‖164  He continues that, ―[i]n terms of wealth and per 
capita income, the social-welfare states again defy the [ideological] 
stereotype that high taxation leads to lower living standards.‖165 
Further, the social welfare states have achieved high levels of 
income, low rates of poverty and a more equal distribution of 
income than the free-market societies.
166
 By contrast, ―[t]he United 
States, among the richest of all the countries in per capita, GNP, 
also has the highest poverty rate by far, at 17.1 percent of 
households living on 50 percent or less than average household 
income.‖167 Social welfare states also appear to have lower rates of 
corruption and high public confidence in the government: ―They 
are rated very highly in their international competitiveness . . . [and 
t]hey achieve high rates of national saving, despite the high tax 
burden. They achieve balanced budgets, despite the large social 
outlays, because the high public spending is matched by adequate 
taxation.‖168 ―Another striking fact about the social-welfare states 
is their very high rate of technological excellence . . . [t]hey are 
heavy investors both in R&D and in higher education and they 
have very high rates of patents per capita as well.‖169 
All of this evidence is presented not to suggest that the 
Scandinavian approach can be a panacea for U.S. problems. After 
all, the homogeneity of those societies must account for some of 
their abundant successes.
170
 But neither does ethnic homogeneity 
vitiate the evidence that strong, well-funded government 
infrastructure programs can improve the operations of the economy 
                                                        
164 Id. at 261. 
165 Id. at 262. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 261. 
168 Id. at 262. 
169 Id. at 263. 
170 Id. at 265. 
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as well as the living conditions of the citizens. It is the kind of 
evidence that challenges the current U.S. ideology and helps us to 
rethink its assumptions. 
A retrospective analysis that incorporates what we have learned 
about the way societies employ, or assign roles to, the three 
governance sectors and the consequences of those choices must 
surely precede and inform attempts to reform the nonprofit sector. 
CONCLUSION 
Commercial activity by nonprofit associations has allowed the 
nonprofits to sustain and expand their operations in an era of 
government downsizing. But this activity comes with significant 
risks to individual nonprofit organizations, to the nonprofit sector 
and, I argue, to society. Calls for reform of the sector are 
undoubtedly justified, but reformers need to rethink the ideological 
policy choices that encouraged the entrepreneurial turn in the 
nonprofit sector and the effects of those policies on the fabric of 
society. Reform must begin with a pragmatic reassessment of the 
effective roles each sector might play in achieving societal goals. 
 
